




































OPTIMAL PROCUREMENT OF A CREDENCE GOOD
UNDER LIMITED LIABILITY∗
Helmut Bester† and Ouyang Yaofu‡
September 2017
Abstract
This paper analyzes the optimal contract for a consumer to procure a credence
good from an expert when (i) the expert might misrepresent his private information
about the consumer’s need, (ii) the expert might not choose the requested service
since his choice of treatment is non-observable, and (iii) limited liability of the expert
precludes imposing penalty payments on him. We characterize payments under the
optimal contract and show that, compared with the first-best, these induce inefficient
undertreatment. We further show that separating diagnosis and treatment increases
consumer surplus. Whether it decreases or increases the likelihood of undertreatment,
however, depends on the accuracy of the expert’s information.
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1 Introduction
This paper analyzes the optimal contract for a consumer to procure a credence good from
an expert. There are two incentive problems: First, only the expert privately receives
information about the consumer’s need by a costless diagnosis. Thus the contract should
provide the expert with incentives for truthful reporting. Second, there is a moral hazard
problem because the expert’s choice of treatment is not observable. Therefore, the contract
should induce the expert to perform the treatment as required. In addition, the expert
is protected by limited liability that all contractual payments by the consumer must be
nonnegative. This implies that the expert cannot be punished too harshly for failure of
treatment.
Consider a consumer who needs one of two treatments to solve his problem. When the
problem is a minor one, a low-cost treatment is appropriate and sufficient while a high-cost
treatment induces overtreatment; when the problem is a major one, the high-cost treatment
is proper and necessary while the low-cost treatment induces undertreatment as it fails.
The consumer only knows the prior probability of his problem, while the expert privately
observes an informative but noisy signal about the consumer’s need. The consumer offers
a contract to the expert before the expert observes the signal; he may choose to implement
either the high-cost treatment or the low-cost treatment based on his prior information only.
Alternatively, he may implement a treatment relying on the expert’s information. While the
credence goods literature mostly does not use a contract-theoretic approach, we adopt a
principal-agent approach to characterize the optimal procurement contract. We show that
compared with the first-best outcome the optimal contract leads to too much undertreatment,
either by too often implementing the low-cost treatment or by too much reliance on the
expert’s noisy signal. Furthermore, inefficient undertreatment, although possibly being
mitigated, still persists when diagnosis and treatment are separately provided by two experts.
Our analysis considers a typical credence goods environment where a consumer wants
to buy a service from an expert who knows better the consumer’s need than the consumer
himself.1 The expert, who is the seller of the service, might misrepresent his superior
information in order to exploit the consumer. This happens because even if the consumer can
determine whether his problem is solved or not, he does not know which service he really
needs. Furthermore, the consumer might also be unable to determine the type of service he
received. Therefore, the expert might even charge a price for an unperformed service and
remain undetected. Due to the expert’s opportunistic behavior, three types of inefficiencies
can arise:2 first, undertreatment arises when the expert provides an insufficient low-cost
1The notion of credence goods was first introduced by Darby and Karni (1973). Differing from search goods
and experience goods (Nelson, 1970), the consumer of a credence good not only ex ante does not know his
need, but even ex post he cannot detect whether his need is properly satisfied. Typical credence goods include
education, repair service, taxi service and medical service. The notion of credence goods has also been applied
to many other goods that bear the “credence property”, such as patents (Thambisetty, 2007), contracting for
infrastructure projects (Dulleck, Gong, and Li, 2015).
2In addition, a forth inefficiency, duplication of search and diagnosis cost, might arise when it is possible for
the consumer to search for second opinions. See Wolinsky (1993) and Pesendorfer and Wolinsky (2003).
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treatment which does not solve the consumer’s problem; second, overtreatment arises when
the expert provides an unnecessary high-cost treatment as a low-cost treatment would have
been sufficient; third, overcharging arises when the expert charges the price of a service he
did not perform.3
Ample evidence shows that inefficiencies are prominent in credence goods markets.
For example, Schneider (2012, p. 3) undertakes a field experiment in the car-repair
service market, and finds that both under- and overtreatment are pervasive: “mechanics
recommended completely unnecessary repairs in 33 percent of the experimental visits and
27 percent of the Canadian visits ... seventy-five percent of the field experiment visits were
characterized by serious undertreatment.” Similar results have been found by a natural field
experiment on taxi rides in Greece (Balafoutas, Beck, Kerschbamer, and Sutter, 2013). The
taxi drivers not only overtreated the uninformed passengers by taking them on significantly
longer detours, but also overcharged those who lacked information on the local tariff system
by about 5%. More significantly, overtreatment has been listed as one of six major categories
for waste in the US health care spending by Berwick and Hackbarth (2012, p. 1514).
They estimated that “this category represented between $158 billion and $226 billion in
wasteful spending in 2011”. In a similar vein, a recent OECD report states: “Examples of
unnecessary or inappropriate care abound at all points of the care pathway, starting with
overtesting and overdiagnosis. Unnecessary use of surgical procedures is not an exception.
... Excessive use of medicines is also an issue; for instance, half of antimicrobial prescriptions
are inappropriate.”4
Our analysis shows that some inefficiencies are in fact unavoidable even in the optimal
contract. Not only the choice of treatment may be distorted by asymmetric information, but
also the payments for a treatment may not reflect its cost. We show that it is optimal to make
payments more contingent on success and failure of a treatment rather than its cost. This
may imply that necessarily some kind of overcharging occurs: after a successful treatment
the expert may be entitled to a payment which is higher than the cost of a high-cost treatment
even when he performs only a low-cost treatment.
Dulleck and Kerschbamer (2006) survey the credence goods literature within a unified
framework. They show that the first-best can be implemented when either the expert is liable
for the resolution of the consumer’s problem (Liability), or the type of treatment provided by
the expert is verifiable and contractible (Verifiability). When neither liability nor verifiability
are satisfied, however, the credence goods market becomes a “market for lemons” (Akerlof,
1970): the quality of service deteriorates, or the market breaks down all together.
We contribute to this literature in three ways. First, we depart from much of the credence
goods literature by employing a principal-agent contracting approach, which is adequate
to analyze problems of asymmetric information in contracting. Second, we assume neither
liability nor verifiability. As will be shown below, large parts of the credence goods literature
3Although overcharging is a pure transfer between the expert and the consumer, it can also cause social
inefficiency by deterring some consumers from demanding the service or a dead-weight loss of taxation if
partially publicly funded.
4OECD (2017, p. 51), Tackling Wasteful Spending on Health, OECD Publishing, Paris.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264266414-en.
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assumes either liability or verifiability or both in their analysis. These studies are relevant in
some situations, but have limited applicability in other situations where either verifiability or
liability is not likely to hold. These situations are not uncommon in credence goods markets.
In the case of a medical treatment, for instance, the patient may be unable to observe
the treatment performed by the expert, while the physician is not liable for the outcome
of treatment. Third, we follow Bester and Dahm (2017) by assuming that the expert’s
diagnosing technology is not perfectly precise. This implies that implementing treatments
based on the expert’s signal is not always optimal. Even if the expert reports truthfully, the
signal might be incorrect, and thus both under- and overtreatment might occur. Furthermore,
we also generalize the expert’s treatment technology to be not perfectly effective: even a
proper treatment fails with small but positive probability. This generalization is not only
realistic, but also necessary for non-observability of the expert’s choice of treatment. This is
so because otherwise one could infer that the expert did not perform the high-cost treatment
if the treatment fails.
In our model success and failure of treatment are observable and contractible. We first
study whether the consumer can design contingent payments in such a way that the expert
adopts one of three possible treatment strategies: the high-cost treatment (H) or the low-cost
treatment (L) independently of the diagnosis outcome, or a treatment choice (S) contingent
on the signal observed by the expert after signing the contract. By the Revelation Principle
(Myerson, 1979) and its extended version (Myerson, 1982), there is no loss of generality in
considering only incentive compatible contracts under which the expert will not only report
truthfully but also implement the treatment as required. In a first step we characterize
the optimal payments for implementing each of the three treatment strategies. We then
derive the overall optimal contract, which maximizes the consumer’s surplus over the three
treatment strategies.
Our main result shows that all three treatment strategies are implementable by properly
designed contracts. Also, each of them can be optimal for some values of the consumer’s
prior. When the prior is highly informative, it is optimal for the consumer to implement
either H or L by not making use of the expert’s information. But when the prior is not
informative enough, utilizing the expert’s signal by implementing strategy S is optimal.
Compared with the first-best outcome, however, the overall optimal contract leads to too
much undertreatment in two ways: (i) by implementing too often the low-cost strategy L
when the consumer’s problem is more likely minor; (ii) by implementing too often strategy
S when the consumer’s problem is more likely major. The driving force behind this result is
basically a tradeoff between rent extraction and efficiency.
Intuitively, since the expert is protected by limited liability and his choice of treatment
is unobservable, implementing a high-cost treatment under H or, with positive probability,
under S must leave a positive rent to the expert. When the consumer’s problem is more
likely minor, strategy H is more likely not needed. The consumer then chooses either to
implement treatment strategy L or S. Due to the rent involved in the latter strategy, the overall
optimal contract requires implementing more often the low-cost treatment only to avoid
leaving such a rent. When the consumer’s problem is more likely major, a low-cost treatment
is more likely insufficient. The consumer then chooses either to implement treatment H
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or S. Interestingly, although implementing treatment S requires an incentive constraint for
truthful reporting, which is not required for H, the expert’s rent under S is comparatively
smaller. Therefore, the overall optimal contract involves too much reliance on the expert’s
information by implementing S.
In Section 6 we extend our model to the case where diagnosis and treatment are
separately provided by two experts, and study whether such an arrangement can avoid
the efficiency losses identified above. Separating diagnosis and treatment is feasible in
some situations. For example, diagnosing and prescribing can be separated from selling
drugs. Indeed, such a practice has been adopted by many countries in their health care
systems such as Germany and the UK. In other situations, nevertheless, this separation
is almost impossible.5 We find that separating diagnosis and treatment reduces some,
but not all, of the inefficiencies when the consumer’s problem is more likely minor or
the expert’s signal is highly accurate. Otherwise, however, separation even increases the
likelihood of inefficient undertreatment. Intuitively, separating the two procedures solves
the adverse selection problem related to the expert’s report. This decreases the limited
liability rent for the expert under treatment strategies H and S. Therefore, when the
consumer’s problem is more likely minor, separation reduces inefficient undertreatment
as implementing treatment strategy S involves less rent for the expert. But when the
consumer’s problem is more likely major, separation can either decrease or increase the
rent difference between implementing treatment strategies H and S. This depends on the
accuracy of the expert’s information: when it is sufficiently precise, separation reduces the
rent difference and the inefficiency of undertreatment under S. Otherwise, the difference
is increased and so inefficient undertreatment becomes more likely as strategy S becomes
optimal. For the consumer, however, separation is beneficial irrespective of the efficiency
effects. He can appropriate a larger share of the surplus under strategies H and S because
separation mitigates the adverse selection problem of truthfully revealing the information of
the diagnosis.
Related Literature
Most of the literature on credence goods assumes either that the expert is liable for the
resolution of the consumer’s problem (Liability), or that the type of treatment provided
by the expert is verifiable and contractible (Verifiability), or both. The typical results are
as follows: (1) when verifiability holds, overcharging can be avoided;6 (2) when liability
holds, undertreatment can be precluded;7 (3) when both verifiability and liability hold, both
overcharging and undertreatment can be prevented.8 The relevance of these three cases
depends on the market environment. Verifiability is more plausible when no special expertise
5See more examples and further discussion for the feasibility of the separation in Darby and Karni (1973),
Emons (1997), Dulleck and Kerschbamer (2006), and Bester and Dahm (2017).
6See Emons (1997),Emons (2001),Pesendorfer and Wolinsky (2003), Dulleck and Kerschbamer (2009),
Bonroy, Lemarié, and Tropéano (2013),Fong, Liu, and Wright (2014), Hilger (2016)
7See Pitchik and Schotter (1987), Wolinsky (1993),Emons (2001),Fong (2005), Sülzle and Wambach
(2005),Hyndman and Ozerturk (2011), Gabszewicz and Resende (2012),Liu (2011).
8See Taylor (1995), Alger and Salanié (2006), Dulleck and Kerschbamer (2009).
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is needed for verifying the type of treatment, such as in the taxi-cab service. Liability is more
likely to hold when the outcome of treatment is easily observable and verifiable. For instance,
in the taxi-cab service the consumer can easily tell whether his destination is reached or not.9
But also situations where neither verifiability nor liability holds are not unrealistic in credence
goods markets. Our paper addresses this kind of environment, which is largely neglected in
the literature.10
There are only a few papers which like us employ a contracting approach to the credence
goods problem. Demski and Sappington (1987) study optimal contracts between a principal
and an agent to induce the agent to acquire costly expertise. This corresponds to the
moral hazard problem of costly diagnosis in the context of credence goods. To focus on
the delegated expertise problem, they further assume treatments to be costless so that the
choice of treatment does not involve a problem of moral hazard. They also preclude any
communication between the expert and the principal.
Dulleck, Gong, and Li (2015) model contracting for an infrastructure project as a credence
good. They analyze how a procurer can motivate contractors to invest in costly design efforts
and to reveal the proper design. While our paper provides conditions under which the
consumer will make use of the expert’s information, in their paper the procurer has to rely
on the contractors’ information, because an unguided guess will never yield the right choice.
Also in their model it is impossible to condition the contract upon the outcome of the project,
whereas we consider payments contingent on success or failure.
Most closely related to our analysis is the contracting model of Bester and Dahm (2017),
who like us consider an expert whose diagnosis technology is noisy. But they focus on a
two-sided incentive problem: investing in costly diagnosis on the expert’s side and subjective
evaluation of success and failure of the treatment on the consumer’s side. There are two key
modeling differences. First, they assume that the expert’s choice of treatment is observable
and verifiable. So, the moral hazard problem related to the expert’s choice of treatment
considered in our model does not exist in their model. Second, in their paper the expert
is liable for the resolution of the consumer’s problem as he has to implement the high-cost
treatment following a failure reported in the first-period. In contrast, our paper focuses on
the tradeoff between rent extraction under limited liability and efficiency. Bester and Dahm
(2017) also consider the effects of separating diagnosis and treatment. They show that the
first-best outcome is always implementable if separation is possible. This is not true in our
setting. Indeed, we show that separation may even increase the likelihood of undertreatment
for some parameter combinations.
This paper is organized as follows. The next section presents the model with our
assumptions on observability and contractability. In Section 3 we characterize the first-best
treatment strategies as a reference point. Section 4 studies the optimal contract for
implementing a given treatment strategy. In Section 5 we derive the overall optimal contract
9Dulleck and Kerschbamer (2006) offer detailed discussions about verifiability and liability in repair service,
taxi cab, and medical treatment markets .
10An exception is Emons (2001). In his model a monopolistic expert chooses a capacity, which can be allocated
between diagnosis and repair. As the consumer cannot observe the expert’s service, the expert has strong






Table 1: Success Probabilities
for the consumer and establish our main results. Section 6 extends our model to situations
where diagnosis and treatment can be separated. Finally, we conclude in Section 7. Some
lengthier proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
2 The Model
Consider a credence good problem with one consumer and one expert. The consumer has a
problem θ which is either a minor one, θL, or a major one, θH . If the problem is solved, he
gets zero utility. Otherwise, he suffers a loss of −L, with L > 0.
The expert can provide two types of treatment, TH and TL. Abusing notation we assume
that the expert’s cost of performing treatment TH is also TH > 0 while the cost of treatment
TL is TL, which is normalized to zero. Also, the expert’s outside option is normalized to
zero. Treatment TH solves both types of problem with probability 0 < ρ < 1. Treatment
TL solves problem θL with probability ρ and problem θH with probability zero. The success
probabilities of the combinations of treatment and problem are illustrated in Table 1.
Our assumption on the effectiveness of expert’s treatment modifies the standard
assumption in the literature on credence goods that ρ = 1.11 We obtain the standard
assumption as the limit ρ → 1. As we will assume that the expert’s choice of treatment is
not observable, the assumption ρ < 1 also ensures that failure of treatment does not reveal
that the expert did not perform treatment TH . In fact, it makes sense that the success of
treatment cannot always be guaranteed. The outcome may depend not only on the type of
treatment but also on other unpredictable contingencies, which potentially lead to failure.
In the medical service, for instance, the proposed treatment by a doctor, even if it is indeed
appropriate and standard based on medical knowledge existing at the relevant time, may fail
in some situations.12 In addition, the results can vary from case to case since medicine is not
an exact science.13
11See the survey by Dulleck and Kerschbamer (2006). There are two exceptions. Glazer and McGuire (1996)
assume that there are two types of expert: a safe type (S) and a risky type (R). Type S can solve the problem
for sure, while the R-type only repairs it with some probability depending on the consumer’s type. Richardson
(1999) assumes, like us, that treatment is only effective with probability smaller than one. But there is only
one treatment available in his setting.
12Situations that involve the risk of failure are not only well recognized, but they should be disclosed to the
consumer within the consent form according to the medical practice in some countries. See.e.g, 12 key points
on consent: the law in England, published by the Department of Health of the UK, March 2001.
13This point has been recognized in Dulleck and Kerschbamer (2006, p. 32) where they write “...With many
sicknesses there is no sufficient treatment, with others success is only random. Thus, a failing treatment is no
perfect signal of undertreatment...”. In addition, this is also the reason for why a medical doctor is not fully
liable for the outcome of treatment.
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To ensure that a positive net expected surplus can be achieved by performing the
appropriate treatment, we assume that
ρL > TH > TL = 0. (1)
We speak of undertreatment when the major problem θH is treated with the low-cost treatment
TL as it is totally unhelpful and always fails. While the minor problem is solved by the
high-cost treatment in the combination (θL, TH), we speak of overtreatment as the low-cost
treatment TL would be as effective as the high-cost treatment TH .
Information and Observability The consumer knows that he has a problem but is
uncertain as to which type it is. He knows, however, the prior probability
Prob(θL) = 1− Prob(θH) = q. (2)
The expert not only knows the prior in (2), but also by performing a costless diagnosis he
can privately observe a noisy signal si ∈ {sL, sH}.14 The signal is correct with probability
σ ∈ (1/2,1), i.e.
Prob(sL|θL) = Prob(sH |θH) = σ, Prob(sL|θH) = Prob(sH |θL) = 1−σ (3)
This assumption generalizes the usual assumption σ = 1 in most of literature on credence
goods.15 After observing the signal, the expert can be obliged to report a signal to the
consumer. As the signal is the expert’s private information, this creates an adverse selection
problem. The expert might behave opportunistically by reporting a signal which he actually
did not observe.
We assume that success or failure of treatment is publicly observable, but the expert’s
choice of treatment is unobservable. Therefore, the payments for the expert can be contingent
on the outcome of treatment, but not directly on the type of treatment. This is likely to
hold when identifying the treatment requires specific expertise but checking the outcome
of treatment needs few experience or skills. Take the car-repair service as an example.
It is obvious whether the car works or not after repair but identifying the type of repair
may require further knowledge. The non-observability of the expert’s choice of treatment
gives rise to an additional problem of moral hazard in our model. The expert might provide
treatment TL, instead of treatment TH as required, to save some treatment cost.
Contracts The consumer can decide to design a contract that implements either treatment
TL or TH based on his prior information only. Or he can decide to implement treatment Ti
when the expert observes a signal si with i ∈ {H, L}. Indeed, the consumer prefers to follow
14The costless diagnosis assumption is appropriate when the diagnosis cost is negligible compared to the
treatment cost, or alternatively the diagnosis is a by-product of the provision of the treatment. This assumption
is also common in this literature, e.g, Pitchik and Schotter (1987), Fong (2005), Liu (2011),Fong, Liu, and
Wright (2014), Hilger (2016).
15An exception is Bester and Dahm (2017). But in their setup diagnosing is costly for the expert and diagnosis
effort is not observable. This creates a moral hazard problem of information acquisition, which we do not
consider in our model.
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his prior information if it is informative enough to identify the proper treatment. Otherwise,
he better trusts the expert’s signal and implements the treatment according to the expert’s
information. Therefore, a contract can specify one of the following three treatment strategies:
• Treatment strategy L: the expert provides treatment TL. The payment for the expert
pL ∈ (pLs, pL f ) is designed such that the expert will indeed always implement treatment
TL, where the payment pLs is paid if the treatment succeeds while pL f is paid otherwise.
• Treatment strategy H: the expert provides treatment TH . Likewise, the payment for the
expert pH ∈ (pHs, pH f ) is designed such that the expert will indeed always implement
treatment TH , where the payment pHs is paid if the treatment succeeds while pH f is
paid otherwise.
• Treatment strategy S: the expert reports to the consumer a signal sˆi ∈ {sL, sH} and then
implements treatment Ti upon reporting signal sˆi for i ∈ {H, L}. The payment for the
expert is designed such that the expert will truthfully report a signal sˆi = si and at the
same time honestly implement treatment Ti upon observing a signal si for i ∈ {H, L}.
Specifically, the payment scheme is {pL, pH} ≡ {(pLs, pL f ), (pHs, pH f )}. When the expert
reports a signal sˆi with i ∈ {H, L}, he receives the payment pis if the treatment succeeds
and pi f otherwise.
Note that both strategies H and S are subject to the moral hazard problem concerning the
expert’s choice of treatment as indicated above. Moreover, strategy S involves in addition
the adverse selection problem of the expert’s private diagnosis information. We indicate the
consumer’s contract decision by its treatment strategy D ∈ {L,H,S}.
Timing The contracting relation proceeds in the following sequence:
1. Nature draws the consumer’s type θ ∈ {θL,θH}. The realization of θ is unobservable
to both the consumer and the expert. Both parties only know the ex ante probabilities
as given by (2).
2. The consumer offers a contract D ∈ {L,H,S} to the expert. This contract stipulates the
expert to perform treatment T ∈ {TL, TH} or to implement treatment Ti upon the expert
observing a signal si ∈ {sH , sL}, and also specifies the corresponding payments as stated
above. If the expert rejects the contract, the contracting game ends.
3. If the expert accepts the contract offer, he performs a costless diagnosis and privately
observes a signal si ∈ {sL, sH}. Under the contract decision D ∈ {L,H} the expert
performs a treatment which can be either the mandated treatment or not. If D= S, the
expert reports a signal sˆi ∈ {sL, sH} and then performs a treatment T j ∈ {TH , TL}. The
expert may report a signal that he did not observe, i.e, sˆi 6= si. He may also choose a
treatment T j 6= Ti upon observing a signal si, for i, j ∈ {H, L}.
4. The success or failure of the treatment is publicly observed. Under a contract decision
D ∈ {L,H}, the expert receives his payment based only on the outcome of the treatment
according to the contract. If D = S, the expert’s payment is based on both his report
and the outcome as specified above.
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The contract is offered at the ex ante stage, i.e. before the expert observes the signal. This
precludes asymmetric information at the contracting stage, which would allow the expert to
extract a rent by his informational advantage. We also assume that the expert is protected
by limited liability so that all payments must be nonnegative. This assumption implies that
the expert cannot be punished too harshly when the treatment fails.
In stage 2 of the above sequence of events, the contract is proposed as a take-it-or-leave-it
offer by the consumer to the expert. This maximizes the consumer’s surplus subject to the
informational constraints of adverse selection and moral hazard, and the institution of limited
liability. But the outcome of this bargaining game can also be obtained as the equilibrium of
Bertrand competition in a market where two or more identical experts compete for consumers
by offering contracts for their diagnosis and treatment service. Competition then forces the
experts to maximize the consumers’ surplus, subject to the same incentive restrictions and
limited liability constraints as in our subsequent analysis.
3 First-Best Treatment Strategy
Before analyzing the optimal contract between the consumer and the expert, we first derive
as a benchmark the first-best outcome in the absence of asymmetric information and moral
hazard.16 Suppose that the expert’s signal is publicly observable and the treatment action
is also contractible. This is plausible when the consumer himself is also an expert, for
instance, when a car-mechanic repairs his own car. In this situation, there exists no incentive
problem and thus no need to condition the expert’s payment on the outcome of treatment,
in particular, rewarding success while punishing failure.17 The limited liability assumption
is trivially satisfied because otherwise the expert would reject the contract. The consumer’s
problem then is reduced to maximizing the overall surplus subject to the expert’s participation
constraint only, which results in the first-best outcome.
As explained above, the consumer has the three possible treatment strategies D ∈ {L,H,S}
at the contracting stage. First, under L the consumer chooses to contract for treatment TL.
He optimally offers a take-it-or-leave-it contract at a price pL = TL = 0, which is the lowest
acceptable price for the expert. Under this contract the consumer’s net surplus is
S∗L ≡ ρqL − TL = ρqL, (4)
because treatment TL solves problem θL with probability ρ but fails for problem θH . Thus,
undertreatment occurs with probability (1− q).
16This analysis is closely related to the characterization of efficient polices for the first-best outcome in Dulleck
and Kerschbamer (2009) and Bester and Dahm (2017). But there are two key differences. First, we consider a
more general setting where even a proper treatment might fail with small but positive probability. Second, both
papers assume that the expert is liable for the resolution of the consumer’s problem: a second-period high-cost
treatment must be implemented whenever the first-period one fails.
17This argument holds because both the consumer and the expert are risk-neutral. In other cases, the
payments for success and failure might still differ as a way to transfer risk between the consumer and the
expert.
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Second, the consumer can also implement H by offering a take-it-or-leave-it contract at a
price pH = TH . This contract gives the consumer the net surplus
S∗H = ρL − TH , (5)
because treatment TH solves both types of problem with probability ρ. But it induces
overtreatment with probability q.
Finally, if under S the consumer decides to use the expert’s signal and to implement
treatment Ti upon signal si, it is optimal to offer a take-it-or-leave-it contract (pL, pH) with
pL = TL = 0 and pH = TH . Under this contract, the consumer pays pL for treatment TL after
observing a signal sL, and pH for treatment TH after a signal sH . The consumer’s expected
surplus from this treatment strategy is
S∗S = qσρL + [q(1−σ) + (1− q)σ](ρL − TH). (6)
The first term on the right-hand-side in (6) relates to the case where the expert’s signal is
sL, which happens with probability [qσ + (1 − q)(1 − σ)]. In this case treatment TL with
zero cost is implemented and repairs the consumer’s problem with probability qσρ. The
second term corresponds to the case where the signal is sH , which happens with probability
[q(1−σ)+(1−q)σ]. In this case treatment TH is implemented, which repairs the consumer’s
problem with probability ρ at the cost TH . Note that undertreatment only occurs when the
expert receives an incorrect signal sL, while overtreatment arises with an incorrect signal sH .
A more precise signal, however, can alleviate both under- and overtreatment, and thus is
beneficial for the consumer because
∂ S∗S/∂ σ = (1− q)ρL − (1− 2q)TH > 0 (7)
by assumption (1).
Based on the consumer’s surplus from the three treatment strategies in (4)-(6), we can
now derive the consumer’s first-best treatment strategy. If the treatment is chosen based on
the prior only, then implementing treatment TL is at least as good as implementing treatment
TH if and only if S
∗
L ≥ S∗H , which is equivalent to
q ≥ q¯ ≡ 1− TH
ρL
(8)
where q¯ ∈ (0,1) since (1). Intuitively, the more likely the consumer’s problem is minor,
the larger is the risk of overtreatment by implementing treatment TH , while the risk
of undertreatment by implementing treatment TL is smaller. Therefore, implementing
treatment TL is more desirable when q is larger.
However, implementing the treatment based on the signal is at least as good as
implementing treatment TH or TL based on the prior only if and only if S
∗
S ≥ S∗H and S∗S ≥ S∗L,
which is equivalent to
q ≥ qH ≡ (1−σ)(ρL − TH)(1−σ)(ρL − TH) +σTH (9)
and
q ≤ qL ≡ σ(ρL − TH)
σ(ρL − TH) + (1−σ)TH . (10)
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Figure 1: First-best Treatments
Note that qH < q¯ < qL as σ ∈ (1/2, 1). Therefore, the consumer optimally decides to trust
the expert’s signal and implement the treatment based on the signal if and only if
qH ≤ q ≤ qL. (11)
Note that both qH and qL are a function of the accuracy of the signal σ with ∂ qH/∂ σ < 0
and ∂ qL/∂ σ > 0, limσ→1 qH = 0, and limσ→1 qL = 1.
We summarize the first-best treatment strategy in the following proposition:
Proposition 1. Assume that the expert’s signal is publicly observable and his choice of treatment
is also contractible. Then the consumer can appropriate the first-best surplus by the following
contract:
(a) For q < qH , treatment strategy H is optimal with the payment pH = TH .
(b) For qH ≤ q ≤ qL, treatment strategy S is optimal with the payment pi = Ti for i ∈ {H, L}.
(c) For q > qL, treatment strategy L is optimal with the payment pL = TL.
Figure 1 illustrates Proposition 1. Implementing the treatment based on the signal
constitutes the first-best treatment strategy within the interval [qH , qL]. Outside this interval,
the high-cost treatment TH is optimal if q < qH , and the low-cost treatment TL if q > qL.
Intuitively, for q < qH the prior indicates that the problem is more likely major, the risk
of overtreatment with implementing treatment TH is comparatively small, while the risk of
undertreatment with treatment TL or implementing the treatment based on the signal is
comparatively large. Therefore, the first-best requires implementing treatment TH based on
the prior only. Vice verse, q > qL implies that the problem is more likely minor, then the
risk of overtreatment dominates the risk of undertreatment. Thus, implementing treatment
TL based on the prior is the first-best. Furthermore, when the prior becomes perfectly
precise as q→ 0 or q→ 1, no further information is needed for deciding proper treatment:
implementing treatment TH (for q = 0) or treatment TL (for q = 1) constitutes the first-best.
Using the expert’s signal, however, becomes preferable for a larger interval of the prior as the
signal becomes more precise. Indeed, when the signal becomes perfectly precise in the limit
σ→ 1, implementing the treatment based on the signal is always the first-best.
4 Treatment Implementation
We now analyze the implementation of the three treatment strategies D ∈ {L,H,S} under
the contractual constraints described in Section 2. We successively characterize the optimal
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payments to implement each of the three treatment strategies subject to the incentive
constraints of adverse selection (truthful reporting), moral hazard (choice of treatment), and
limited liability. This allows us to determine in the next section the overall optimal treatment
strategy, which yields the highest consumer surplus among the three strategies.
After the expert privately observes the signal of his diagnosis, the consumer maintains his
prior belief in (2) while the expert updates his belief based on the signal. Denote the expert’s
posterior belief by µL and µH upon observing signal sL and sH , respectively. By Bayes rule,
we have
µL ≡ Prob(θL|sL) = 1− Prob(θH |sL) = qσqσ+ (1− q)(1−σ) ,
µH ≡ Prob(θL|sH) = 1− Prob(θH |sH) = q(1−σ)q(1−σ) + (1− q)σ .
(12)
Note that
0< µH < q < µL < 1, (13)
since σ ∈ (1/2,1). Therefore, the expert and the consumer hold different beliefs about the
nature of the consumer’s problem after the expert observes the signal.
We begin with the two simple cases in which the consumer wants to implement treatment
TL or TH without making use of the expert’s diagnosis. In these cases, the expert is not obliged
to report a signal to the consumer, but only needs to provide the treatment as required.
Therefore, the only incentive problem involved is the moral hazard problem concerning the
expert’s choice of treatment.
Consider first the case D= L where the consumer requires treatment TL from the expert.
In this case, there is no moral hazard problem because the expert’s cost satisfies TH > TL = 0.
Therefore, to implement L the consumer can make the payments to the expert independent
of the outcome of treatment. If the consumer offers a payment pL = pLs = pL f for treatment
TL, his expected surplus is
SL = qρL − pL, (14)
and the expert’s profit is
Π(TL) = pL − TL = pL. (15)
Therefore, the expert’s participation constraint and the limited liability constraint under the
contract are the same:
pL ≥ 0 (IR&LL)
Since obviously the consumer maximizes his expected surplus subject to (IR&LL) by setting
pL = 0, we have the following result:
Proposition 2. The optimal contract to implement treatment strategy L has the following
properties:
(a) The optimal payment is
pL = pLs = pL f = TL = 0. (16)
(b) The expert obtains no rent while the consumer appropriates all economic rents, i.e.
Π(TL) = 0, SL = qρL. (17)
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Because there is no moral hazard problem the consumer appropriates all economic rents
and obtains the same surplus as in the first-best.
Next we consider the case D= H where the consumer wants to mandate treatment TH . In
this case there exists a moral hazard problem associated with the expert’s choice of treatment.
The expert could provide treatment TL rather than TH to reduce his cost. By the Revelation
Principle (Myerson, 1979, 1982), we can restrict ourselves to incentive feasible contracts.
Assume that the consumer offers a contract (pHs, pH f ) so that the expert receives the
payment pHs if the treatment succeeds, and pH f if it fails. Then, by providing treatment TH
as required the expert obtains an expected profit
Π(TH) = Π(TH |sL) = Π(TH |sH) = ρpHs + (1−ρ)pH f − TH , (18)
as the treatment TH succeeds with probability ρ. If, however, the expert selects treatment TL
instead, based on his posterior belief in (12) his expected profits after a signal sL and sH are:
Π(TL|sL) = µLρpHs + (1−µLρ)pH f − TL, (19)
Π(TL|sH) = µHρpHs + (1−µHρ)pH f − TL, (20)
as treatment TL only solves problem θL with probability ρ.
Therefore, the expert will indeed implement treatment TH upon observing a signal sL and
sH if and only if
Π(TH)≥ Π(TL|sL), Π(TH)≥ Π(TL|sH) (21)
This equivalently implies that the contractual payments must satisfy the following two
incentive compatibility constraints:
ρ(1−µL)(pHs − pH f )≥ TH , (ICL)
ρ(1−µH)(pHs − pH f )≥ TH . (ICH)
Intuitively, the left-hand sides of both (ICL) and (ICH) are the additional benefits by
implementing treatment TH and the right-hand sides the additional costs. The expert will
indeed implement treatment TH if the additional benefits exceed the additional treatment
costs. Due to (13), the constraint (ICL) implies the constraint (ICH). Therefore, the
contractual payments are incentive compatible as long as the constraint (ICL) is satisfied.
The logic is that upon observing a signal sL the expert believes that the consumer’s problem
is more likely minor. Then the additional benefits from honestly implementing treatment TH
are smaller than that upon observing a signal sH . Therefore, if the expert prefers to implement
treatment TH after a signal sL, he will certainly do so also after a signal sH .
For the expert to accept the contract, he has to earn a non-negative profit under the
contract, so that Π(TH)≥ 0, which is equivalent to
ρpHs + (1−ρ)pH f − TH ≥ 0 (IR)
In addition, the expert is protected by limited liability that all payments must be nonnegative:
pHs ≥ 0, pH f ≥ 0 (LL)
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To optimally implement H, the consumer maximizes his expected surplus
SH = ρL −ρpHs − (1−ρ)pH f (22)
subject to the constraints (ICL), (IR), and (LL). In the Appendix we prove the following
result:
Proposition 3. The optimal contract to implement treatment strategy H has the following
properties:
(a) The optimal payments are
pH f = 0, pHs =
TH
ρ(1−µL) . (23)
(b) The expert’s profits and the consumer’s surplus are
Π(TH) =
µL TH
1−µL , SH = ρL −
TH
1−µL . (24)
Under the optimal contract, only the limited liability constraint in state of failure is
binding: the expert is punished by zero payment when the treatment fails. Meanwhile,
to induce the expert to indeed implement treatment TH , the contract rewards him with a
net profit when the treatment succeeds. As a result, the expert receives a strictly positive
limited liability rent Π(TH) > 0. This is a standard result in principal-agent models with
moral hazard and limited liability (see e.g. Sappington (1983)). An interesting insight in our









Intuitively, when the signal becomes more precise, upon observing a signal sL the expert is
more inclined to implement treatment TL rather than treatment TH as required. In turn, the
optimal contract has to provide a stronger incentive for the expert to choose treatment TH ,
i.e. a larger reward for success. As this raises the rents of the expert, a more precise diagnosis
is detrimental for the consumer for the implementation of H.
Finally, we turn to the third case D = S in which the consumer wants to elicit
truthful reporting and implementing a treatment Ti in accordance with signal si. Again,
by the Revelation Principle of Myerson (1979, 1982), we can restrict ourselves to incentive
compatible contracts under which the expert will not only report truthfully but also
implement the treatment based on the signal. Assume that the consumer offers a contract
{(pLs, pL f ), (pHs, pH f )}. When the expert reports a signal sˆi with i ∈ {H, L}, he receives the
payment pis if the treatment succeeds, and pi f otherwise.
After observing the signal, the expert’s strategy consists of reporting a signal sˆi ∈ {sˆL, sˆH}
and choosing a treatment T j ∈ {TL, TH}, denoted as a combination (sˆi, T j). Therefore, after
each signal, there are four options available for the expert. We denote by Π(sˆi, T j|si) the
expert’s expected profits from choosing a combination (sˆi, T j) upon observing a signal si.
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After signal sL the expert will indeed report signal sˆL and choose treatment TL, if this
strategy is at least as profitable as any other. In other words, the contractual payments must
satisfy the following incentive compatibility constraints after signal sL,
Π(sˆL, TL|sL)≥ Π(sˆi, T j|sL), for i, j ∈ {L, H}, (ICL)
which are equivalent to
µLρpLs + (1−µLρ)pL f − TL ≥ ρpLs + (1−ρ)pL f − TH , (ICL1)
µLρpLs + (1−µLρ)pL f − TL ≥ µLρpHs + (1−µLρ)pH f − TL, (ICL2)
µLρpLs + (1−µLρ)pL f − TL ≥ ρpHs + (1−ρ)pH f − TH . (ICL3)
Note that the constraint (ICL2) ensures that the expert does not report signal sˆH in
combination with treatment TL; the constraints (ICL1) and (ICL3) guarantee that the expert
does not choose treatment TH after he reported a signal sˆL or sˆH .
Similarly, upon observing the signal sH the expert will truthfully report sˆH and choose
treatment TH if the contractual payments satisfy the incentive compatibility constraints after
signal sH :
Π(sˆH , TH |sH)≥ Π(sˆi, T j|sH), for i, j ∈ {H, L}. (ICH)
These constraints are equivalent to:
ρpHs + (1−ρ)pH f − TH ≥ µHρpLs + (1−µHρ)pL f − TL, (ICH1)
ρpHs + (1−ρ)pH f − TH ≥ ρpLs + (1−ρ)pL f − TH , (ICH2)
ρpHs + (1−ρ)pH f − TH ≥ µHρpHs + (1−µHρ)pH f − TL. (ICH3)
Note that the constraint (ICH2) induces the expert not to report sˆL; the constraints (ICH1)
and (ICH3) guarantee that the expert cannot gain by selecting treatment TL and reporting
either sˆL or sˆH .
For the expert to accept the contract, he has to earn a non-negative expected profit under
the contract. We denote by λ the ex ante probability that the expert observes a signal sL:
λ := qσ+ (1− q)(1−σ). (26)
Then the expert’s ex ante participation constraint requires that
Π(TS) = λΠ(sˆL, TL|sL) + (1−λ)Π(sˆH , TH |sH)≥ 0, (IR)
because with probability λ he observes signal sL and obtains the profit Π(sˆL, TL|sL) by a
combination (sˆL, TL), and with probability 1 − λ his profit is Π(sˆH , TH |sH) after signal sH .
In addition, all payments must be nonnegative:
pLs ≥ 0, pL f ≥ 0, pHs ≥ 0, pH f ≥ 0, (LL)
because the expert is protected by limited liability.
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To optimally implement strategy S, the payments {(pLs, pL f ), (pHs, pH f )} have to maximize
the consumer’s expected surplus
SS =λ[µLρL −µLρpLs − (1−µLρ)pL f ]
+ (1−λ)[ρL −ρpHs − (1−ρ)pH f ] (27)
subject to the incentive constraints (ICL1)–(ICL3), (ICH1)–(ICH3), the participation constraint
(IR), and the limited liability constraint (LL). In the Appendix we derive the following result
on the solution of this problem:
Proposition 4. The optimal contract to implement treatment strategy S has the following
properties:
(a) The optimal payments are
pL f = pH f = 0, pLs = pHs =
TH
ρ(1−µH) . (28)
(b) The expert’s profits and the consumer’s surplus are
Π(TS) =
qTH






In Proposition 4, the optimal contractual payments depend not on the expert’s report
but only on the treatment outcome. When the treatment outcomes are the same, the expert
receives the same payments regardless of his report and treatment. Thus, in some sense
overcharging is unavoidable: in the event of success the expert receives a payment which is
higher than the cost of the high-cost treatment TH even when he performs only the low-cost
treatment TL. The reason is the adverse selection problem related to the expert’s report. With
payments that depend on his report, the expert would always report the signal that gives him
a larger profit.
Similar to Proposition 3, under the optimal contract the limited liability constraint in state
of failure is binding: the expert receives zero payment when the treatment fails. When the
treatment succeeds, however, the expert is rewarded by a net profit. This motivates him to
select treatment TH after signal sH . As a result, the expert also earns a positive expected rent










Intuitively, given that the expert reports truthfully, the contractual payments must induce
the expert to implement treatment TH only after signal sH . When the signal becomes more
precise, signal sH indicates problem θH with larger confidence, and so deviating to treatment
TL becomes less attractive for the expert. Thus, motivating the expert to select TH after sH
becomes easier, and this leads to a smaller rent for the expert.
This means that the consumer enjoys not only the efficiency gains from better information


















because, as long as SS > 0, all the three terms are strictly positive: the first two terms are the
benefits of a more precise signal from reducing undertreatment and overtreatment; the third
one is the benefit from alleviating the moral hazard problem. As a result, differently from
the situation in Proposition 3, here the consumer is better off if the expert is better informed.
5 Optimal Contracts
Propositions 2, 3, and 4 characterize the optimal contracts to implement a given treatment
strategy D ∈ {L,H,S}. In this section, we derive the overall optimal contract by comparing
the consumer’s expected surplus from these treatment strategies.
We compare first the desirability of implementing treatments L and H, under which the
consumer does not seek the expert’s advice. Let SLH(q) be the difference of the consumer’s
surplus from implementing treatment TL and treatment TH . From Propositions 2 and 3 we
obtain
SLH(q)≡ SL − SH = TH1−µL − (1− q)ρL. (32)
Implementing treatment TL is thus at least as good as treatment TH if SLH(q) ≥ 0. Note that




(1− q)2(σ− 1)ρL −σTH
(1− q)2(σ− 1) > 0. (33)
Intuitively, the risk of overtreatment with treatment TH increases in q, while the risk of
undertreatment with treatment TL decreases in q. Therefore, implementing treatment TL
becomes more attractive as q increases. Since SLH(0) = TH − ρL < 0 and SLH(q) > 0 for q
close enough to unity, there exists an unique qˆ ∈ (0,1) such that
SLH(qˆ) = 0. (34)
This means that implementing treatment L is better than H for q > qˆ; for q < qˆ implementing
treatment H is better. This result is similar to the role of q¯ in (8) in the first-best. But, it is
easily verified that18
qˆ < q¯. (35)
Therefore, in comparison with the first-best, implementing treatment TH is desirable for a
smaller range of priors. The reason is that by Proposition 3 treatment TH must entail a
positive rent for the expert. We summarize the result of this comparison in the following
proposition.
Proposition 5. When treatment choice is nonobservable, implementing treatment strategy L is
at least as good as H if and only if q ≥ qˆ; otherwise implementing strategy H is better. Compared
with the first-best, the consumer chooses less often to implement strategy H because qˆ < q¯.








Figure 2: Optimal Treatments
We proceed by comparing treatment strategies L and S. Define SLS(q) as the difference of
the consumer’s surplus from these two strategies:
SLS(q)≡ SL − SS = (λµL + 1−λ) TH1−µH − (1−λ)(1−µH)ρL, (36)
where the first term represents the additional cost of treatment strategy S, as it involves
treatment TH with positive probability, and the second its additional benefits. Similarly, to
compare treatment strategies H and S, let SHS(q) denote the difference of the consumer’s
surplus from strategies H and S:
SHS(q)≡ SH − SS = λ(1−µL)ρL −

TH





where the first term is the additional benefit of treatment strategy H and the second its
additional cost.
Implementing treatment strategy S is at least as good as implementing strategy L or H if
and only if
SLS(q)≤ 0 and SHS(q)≤ 0. (38)
Analogously to the critical values qL and qH in (9) and (10) for the analysis of the first-best,
we denote by qˆL and qˆH the values of the prior where
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SLS(qˆL) = 0, SHS(qˆH) = 0. (39)
The following proposition, which we prove in the Appendix, characterizes the overall optimal
contract for the consumer.
Proposition 6. When the signal is the expert’s private information and treatment choice is
unobservable, the optimal contract has the following properties:
(a) For q > qˆL, treatment strategy L is optimal with the payments in Proposition 2. Further,
qˆL < qL.
(b) For q < qˆH , treatment strategy H is optimal with the payments in Proposition 3. Further,
qˆH < qH .
(c) For qˆH ≤ q ≤ qˆL, treatment strategy S is optimal with the payments in Proposition 4.
Figure 2 illustrates the results in Proposition 6 and compares them with the first-best in
Proposition 1. For values of the prior q in the interval [qˆH , qˆL], the optimal contract uses the
19Note that, as we show below, qˆH > 0 only if σ is not too close to unity
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expert’s information and implements treatment Ti after signal si. Outside this interval, the
treatment does not depend on the expert’s information: treatment TH is optimal if q < qˆH ,
and treatment TL is optimal if q > qˆL.
Since qˆL < qL, there is a distortion relative to the first-best in the nonempty interval
[qˆL, qL]. Within this interval the consumer chooses to implement TL, whereas in the first-best
the treatment choice would depend on the expert’s signal. While in the first–best treatment
TH would be selected after sH , under the optimal contract TL is chosen instead. In this sense,
there is a positive probability of undertreatment when q ∈ (qˆL, qL]. The reason is, of course,
that treatment strategy S has to leave a rent to the expert, which makes this strategy less
attractive than L.
Similarly, undertreatment occurs also for values of q in the nonempty interval [qˆH , qH].
Here the optimal contract implements TL after the expert observes sL. In the first–best,
however, treatment TH would always be chosen. The intuition is that under both treatment
strategies S and H the expert receives a rent. But, the expert’s rent is higher under H than
under S. This induces the consumer to rely on the expert’s information rather than to mandate
treatment TH .
We conclude this section by studying the optimal contract in the limiting case σ→ 1, in
which the signal becomes perfectly precise. Note that
lim
σ→1λ= 1, limσ→1µL = 1, limσ→1µH = 0. (40)
Therefore,
lim
σ→1 SLS = TH − (1− q)ρL, limσ→1 SHS = −∞. (41)
By the first equality in (41) and (39) we obtain that limσ→1 qˆL = 1 − TH/ρL. The second
equality in (41) implies that for σ close enough to unity treatment strategy H is always
inferior to S. This is so because H would require the expert to choose treatment TH also after
observing signal sL. As the signal becomes perfectly precise, however, the expert knows
almost for sure that the consumer’s problem is θL after signal sL. Therefore, he knows
that the low-cost treatment TL is almost certainly sufficient. Consequently, implementing
TH independently of the expert’s information becomes not only almost impossible but also
undesirable for the consumer.
The following proposition summarizes our observations for the overall optimal contract
for the limiting case σ→ 1.
Proposition 7. In the limit σ→ 1 treatment strategy S is optimal if q < 1− TH/ρL, otherwise
strategy L is optimal.
As illustrated in Figure 3, also in the limit σ → 1 the overall optimal contract involves
undertreatment. This happens for q ∈ (1− TH/ρL, 1), where the first–best is strategy S but
the optimal contract implements L.
6 Separation of Diagnosis and Treatment
In this section, we explore whether separating diagnosis and treatment can reduce the
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Figure 3: Optimal Treatments for σ→ 1
diagnosis and treatment is feasible in some situations. For example, in the medical services
prescribing and selling drugs can be performed by different agents.20 The idea that this may
reduce incentive problems in the provision of credence goods has been discussed already by
Darby and Karni (1973): the expert performing the diagnosis may have less incentives to
give wrong advice if he does not profit from performing the treatment.
We assume in this section that diagnosis and treatment are two independent procedures
and that the consumer can contract with two different experts, d and t, for diagnosis and
treatment. Expert d is an expert for diagnosis and can acquire the signal about the consumer’s
problem at zero cost; expert t is an expert for treatment and can provide treatment Ti by
incurring the cost Ti ∈ {TH , TL}. After observing the signal, expert d makes a report or
prescription, which is observable to both the consumer and the expert t. Otherwise, the
sequence of the events and the assumptions on observability are the same as in Section 2.
Treatment Implementation As in our previous analysis, there are three treatment
strategies D ∈ {L,H,S}. Since diagnosing is costless for expert d, the consumer’s payment
to him is optimally set equal to zero. Under this payment expert d will truthfully report the
signal, because he cannot benefit from misrepresenting. Consequently, not only the treatment
expert t but also the consumer can now observe the diagnosis signal at zero cost. Effectively,
the situation is the same as if the consumer could perform the diagnosis by himself. As a
result, the consumer and the expert t hold the same posterior belief as in (12) after the
reported signal. Since there is no longer an adverse selection problem of truthful reporting,
we need to consider contracting only between the consumer and the treatment expert t.
In the same way as in Section 4, we begin by deriving the optimal implementation of a
given strategy D ∈ {L,H,S}. First, consider strategy L: Since this strategy does not make use
of the diagnosis, Proposition 2 also applies under separation and the consumer appropriates
all economic rents.
Second, we consider treatment strategy H. Even though under this strategy treatment
TH is implemented independently of the information revealed by the diagnosis, it turns out
that the consumer now can improve upon the optimal contract in Proposition 3 by offering
a contract contingent both on the treatment outcome and on the signal. Assume that the
consumer offers a contract {(pLs, pL f ), (pHs, pH f )}. When the signal is si, expert t receives
the payment pis if the treatment succeeds and pi f otherwise, with i ∈ {H, L}. Then, upon
observing signal sL or sH , by choosing treatment TH as required the treatment expert t obtains
20See Dulleck and Kerschbamer (2006) for more examples where separation is feasible or not.
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the expected profit
Π(TH |sL) = ρpLs + (1−ρ)pL f − TH , (42)
Π(TH |sH) = ρpHs + (1−ρ)pH f − TH , (43)
as treatment TH always succeeds with probability ρ. If however expert t chose TL instead,
then based on the posterior belief in (12) his expected profit would be
Π(TL|sL) = µLρpLs + (1−µLρ)pL f − TL, (44)
Π(TL|sH) = µHρpHs + (1−µHρ)pH f − TL, (45)
because treatment TL solves only problem θL with probability ρ.
Therefore, the expert will indeed choose treatment TH after signal sL and signal sH if and
only if
Π(TH |sL)≥ Π(TL|sL), Π(TH |sH)≥ Π(TL|sH). (46)
Equivalently, the contractual payments must satisfy the following two incentive compatibility
constraints:
ρ(1−µL)(pLs − pL f )≥ TH , (ICL)
ρ(1−µH)(pHs − pH f )≥ TH . (ICH)
In addition, for the expert to accept the contract, he has to earn a non-negative expected
profit under the contract. Since his expected profit is
Πs(TH)≡ λΠ(TH |sL) + (1−λ)Π(TH |sH), (47)
the contract must satisfy the ex ante participation constraint:
λ[ρpLs + (1−ρ)pL f ] + (1−λ)[ρpHs + (1−ρ)pH f ]− TH ≥ 0. (IR)
Finally, we have the constraints
pis ≥ 0, pi f ≥ 0 for i ∈ {L, H}, (LL)
because the expert is protected by limited liability.
To optimally implement treatment strategy H, the consumer maximizes his expected
surplus
SsH = ρL −λ[ρpLs + (1−ρ)pL f ]− (1−λ)[ρpHs + (1−ρ)pH f ] (48)
subject to the constraints (ICL), (ICH), (IR), and (LL). In the Appendix we prove the
following result:
Proposition 8. When diagnosis and treatment are separated, the optimal contract to implement
treatment strategy H has the following properties:
(a) The optimal payments are
pL f = pH f = 0, pLs =
TH






















When diagnosis and treatment are separated, the consumer can retain more economic
rents by the truthful signal obtained from expert d. Indeed the consumer surplus SsH in
Proposition 8 is higher than the consumer surplus SH in Proposition 3 because µL > µH . The
intuition is that the consumer’s knowledge of the signal softens the incentive constraint after
signal sH . Therefore, the optimal payment pHs is lower than pLs. While the t-expert’s rent is
decreased relative the situation without separation, it is still positive. Also it increases with





(1− q)σ2(1−σ)2 TH > 0, (51)
similarly to the case without separation in (25).
Third, to implement treatment strategy S the consumer offers the payments
{(pLs, pL f ), (pHs, pH f )}, with the same interpretation as above. These payments have to satisfy
the incentive constraints that expert t will indeed choose treatment Ti after signal si
Π(TL|sL)≥ Π(TH |sL), Π(TH |sH)≥ Π(TL|sH), (52)
which are equivalent to
µLρpLs + (1−µLρ)pL f ≥ ρpLs + (1−ρ)pL f − TH , (ICL)
ρpHs + (1−ρ)pH f − TH ≥ µHρpHs + (1−µHρ)pH f . (ICH)
In addition, the contract must also satisfy the same participation constraint as in (IR) and
the same limited liability constraints as in (LL).
Note that the formula for the consumer’s surplus SsS from implementing S under
separation is the same as for SS in (27). The following result, which is proven in the
Apppendix, characterizes the solution of the consumer’s problem to maximize SsS subject to
(ICL), (ICH), (IR) and (LL):
Proposition 9. When diagnosis and treatment are separated, the optimal contact to implement
treatment strategy S has the following properties:
(a) The optimal payments are:
pLs = pL f = pH f = 0, pHs =
TH
ρ(1−µH) . (53)
(b) The profits of expert t and the consumer’s expected surplus are:
Πs(TS) = (1−λ) µH TH1−µH , S
s
S = (λµL + 1−λ)ρL − (1−λ)TH1−µH . (54)
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As in the previous proposition, under separation the consumer can ensure himself a higher
surplus compared with Proposition 4 as SsS > SS. This is so because separation allows the
consumer to keep the rent for inducing truthful reporting. Still, there remains a positive rent
for expert t to motivate him implementing treatment TH after a signal sH . His rent, however,









TH < 0. (55)
The intuition is the same as for the inequality in (30) in the case without separation.
Optimal Contracts We can now compare the consumer’s surplus in Propositions 2, 8 and
9 to derive the optimal treatment strategy for the consumer when diagnosis and treatment
are separately provided by two experts.
Let SsLS(q) be the difference of the consumer’s surplus from treatment strategies L and S
under separation of diagnosis and treatment:
SsLS(q)≡ SL − SsS = (1−λ) µH TH1−µH + (1−λ)TH − (1−λ)(1−µH)ρL. (56)
Similarly, let SsHS(q) be the difference of the consumer’s surplus from H and S:
SsHS(q)≡ SsH − SsS = λ(1−µL)ρL − λTH1−µL . (57)
We denote by qsL and q
s
H the critical values of the prior where
SsLS(q
s




H) = 0. (58)
In the following result, which we prove in the Appendix, these critical values play the same
role as the critical values qL and qH in (9) and (10) for the first-best, and qˆL and qˆH in (39)
for the optimal contract without separation. To state the result, we define the parameter
γ≡ (1+p5)/2≈ 1.61803, (59)
which is known in mathematics as the “golden ratio” or the “golden mean”.
Proposition 10. When diagnosis and treatment are separated, the optimal contract has the
following properties:




(b) For q < qsH , treatment strategy H is optimal with the payments in Proposition 8. Further,
qH > q
s
H > qˆH if σ ∈ (γ− 1,1), and qH > qˆH > qsH if σ ∈ (1/2,γ− 1).




















Case 2: σ ∈ (1/2,γ− 1)
Figure 4: Optimal Treatments under Separation
Figure 4 illustrates Proposition 10. The qualitative features of the optimal contract are
similar to the situation without separation in Proposition 6: the diagnosis signal plays a
role for the selection of treatment only for intermediate values of the prior. If the prior is
sufficiently informative, treatment TH is implemented for low values of the prior and TL for
high values.
However, the two threshold values of the prior, qsL and q
s
H , differ from qˆL and qˆH in
Proposition 6. This implies that the likelihood of undertreatment is unambiguously reduced
in the interval q ∈ [qˆL, qsL], because only under separation the first-best strategy S is used. In
case 1 in Figure 4, where the signal is relatively accurate, separation reduces the likelihood
of undertreatment also in the interval [qˆH , qsH], because only under separation the first-best
strategyH is used. In contrast, if the signal is not very accurate as in case 2, undertreatment is
increased in the interval q ∈ [qsH , qˆH], because separation makes strategy S optimal, whereas
without separation the first-best strategy H is optimal. Thus, when the consumer’s problem
is more likely major for low values of q, the efficiency properties of separation are ambiguous
as they depend on the precision of the diagnosis. Note, however, that from the consumer’s
perspective separation of diagnosis and treatment is always preferable. The reason is that,
by Propositions 8 and 9, separation reduces the rents that the consumer has to leave to the
expert under strategies H and S.
Even though separation certainly reduces inefficient undertreatment for high values of
σ, it cannot restore the first-best as qsL < qL and q
s
H < qH . While separating diagnosis and
treatment solves the adverse selection problem of the expert’s private diagnosis information,
the tradeoff between rent extraction and efficiency persists due to the moral hazard problem
of unobservable treatment choice and limited liability. This explains the difference with
Bester and Dahm (2017), who under the assumption of verifiable treatments show that
separating diagnosis and treatment can always implement the first-best outcome.
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7 Conclusion
We have analyzed the optimal contract for a consumer to procure a credence good from
an expert who obtains additional, but imprecise information about the consumer’s need by a
costless diagnosis. There are two incentive problems. First, the diagnosis result is the expert’s
private information. This creates an adverse selection problem of truthful reporting. Second,
the expert’s choice of treatment is not observable, which leads to a moral hazard problem of
treatment selection. In addition, the expert is protected by limited liability so that penalty
payments from the expert to the consumer are prohibited.
There are three feasible treatment strategies. Ex ante, before the expert diagnoses
the problem, the consumer can offer a contract for implementing one of three treatment
strategies. Whenever a high-cost treatment is part of a treatment strategy, implementing this
strategy must entail a strictly positive rent for the expert. As a result, the strategy becomes
less attractive for the consumer. We show that, compared with the first-best outcome, the
optimal contract therefore leads to too much undertreatment. First, if the consumer’s prior
probability makes it highly likely that his problem is a minor one, he may refrain from using
the expert’s information by insisting on a low-cost treatment. For some values of the prior
this is inefficient because in the first-best a high-cost treatment would be selected after the
diagnosis indicates a major problem. Second, if the consumer’s prior probability makes it
highly likely that his problem is a major one, then in the first-best the high-cost treatment
is efficient. Yet, under the optimal contract the consumer may choose to implement the
low-cost treatment instead after the expert’s imprecise diagnosis indicates a minor problem.
In summary, relative to the first-best not only the implementation of treatment strategies may
be inefficient but also the usage of the expert’s information.
While in the main part of our analysis a single expert performs both diagnosis and
treatment, we also consider the case where the two activities can be allocated to two separate
experts. We show that this reduces the first type of inefficiency indicated above. For the
second type of inefficiency indicated above, the result depends on the accuracy of the experts
diagnosis: if it is highly accurate the inefficiency is reduced, otherwise it is increased. In any
case, also with separation the optimal contract involves undertreatment for some parameter
combinations. But from the consumer’s perspective separation is always desirable because
he has to leave less rents to the experts and so receives a higher expected surplus.
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Appendix
This appendix contains the proofs of Propositions 3, 4,6, and 8 – 10. All other propositions
are substantiated in the main text.
Proof of Proposition 3: Define ∆H ≡ ρ(pHs − pH f ). The consumer’s program can then be
rewritten as
max{pH f ,∆H}
ρL − pH f −∆H (60)
subject to the transformed constraints
(1−µL)∆H ≥ TH , (ICL)
pH f +∆H − TH ≥ 0, (IR)
pH f ≥ 0, pH f +∆H ≥ 0, (LL)
Let us ignore the constraint (IR)for the moment, which will be checked later. Note that the
constraint (ICL) puts no further restriction on pH f , then pH f = 0 follows immediately from
the first inequality of constraint (LL) as the consumer’s surplus is strictly decreasing in pH f .
Since the consumer’s surplus is strictly decreasing in∆H , it is optimal to set∆H = TH/(1−
µL) to satisfy the constraint (ICL). Substituting pH f = 0 into∆H , we get pHs = TH/ρ(1−µL).
Therefore, the optimal payments are
pH f = 0, pHs =
TH
ρ(1−µL) . (61)
It remains to check this contract indeed satisfies the constraint (IR). The expert’s expected
profits and the consumer’s expected surplus under the contact are
Π(TH) =
µL TH
(1−µL) , SH = ρL −
TH
(1−µL) , (62)
where Π(TH)> 0 by (13). This shows that the contract with the payments in (61) is optimal.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 4: Define ∆ f ≡ pL f − pH f , ∆L ≡ ρ(pLs− pL f ), and ∆H ≡ ρ(pHs− pH f ).
Ignoring for the moment the constraint (IR) , the consumer’s problem then is equivalent to
max{pH f ,∆ f ,∆L ,∆H}
−[pH f +λ∆ f +λµL∆L + (1−λ)∆H] (63)
subject to the six transformed incentive constraints
∆L(1−µL)≤ TH , (ICL1)
∆ f ≥ µL(∆H −∆L), (ICL2)
∆ f ≥∆H −µL∆L − TH , (ICL3)
∆ f ≤∆H −µH∆L − TH , (ICH1)
∆ f ≤∆H −∆L, (ICH2)
∆H(1−µH)≥ TH , (ICH3)
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and the limited liability constraints
pH f ≥ 0, pH f +∆ f ≥ 0, pH f +∆H ≥ 0, pH f +∆ f +∆L ≥ 0. (LL)
Note that the constraints (ICH2) and (ICL3) imply that
∆H −∆L ≥∆ f ≥∆H −µL∆L − TH ⇒∆L(1−µL)≤ TH , (64)
where the last inequality is exactly constraint (ICL1). Thus, the constraint (ICH2) and (ICL3)
imply the constraint (ICL1). Moreover, the constraints (ICH1) and (ICL2) imply that
∆H −µH∆L − TH ≥∆ f ≥ µL(∆H −∆L)≥ µH(∆H −∆L) (65)
⇒∆H(1−µH)≥ TH
where the last inequality in the first line holds as µL > µH by (13). Thus, the constraints
(ICH1) and (ICL2) imply the constraint (ICH3).
Since pH f is not constrained by the expert’s incentive constraints and the consumer’s
surplus is decreasing in pH f , it follows from the first requirement of the constraint (LL)
that pH f = 0. Therefore, the consumer’s problem is reduced to choose the optimal triple
{∆ f ,∆L,∆H} to maximize his expected surplus subject to the remaining four incentive
constraints. In what follows, we first show that ∆ f ≥ 0, ∆L ≥ 0, and ∆H ≥ 0; then we
solve for the optimal triple by employing the Lagrangian method.
First, combining the constraints (ICL2) and (ICH2), then
µL(∆H −∆L)≤∆ f ≤∆H −∆L ⇒∆ f ≥ 0, (66)
as µL ∈ (q, 1] due to (13). Second, by combining the constraint (ICL3) and (ICH1), we get
∆H −µL∆L − TH ≤∆ f ≤∆H −µH∆L − TH
⇒ (µL −µH)∆L ≥ 0⇒∆L ≥ 0, (67)
as µL ≥ µH by (13). Third, by the constraint (ICH3) we get ∆H ≥ TH/(1−µH)> 0.
The Lagrangian of the consumer’s problem is
L =− [λ∆ f +λµL∆L + (1−λ)∆H] +φ1(∆ f −µL∆H +µL∆L) (68)
+φ2(∆ f −∆H +µL∆L + TH) +φ3(∆H −µH∆L − TH −∆ f )
+φ4(∆H −∆L −∆ f )
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By taking derivatives we obtain the Kuhn-Tucker Conditions:
∂ L
∂∆ f






























=∆H −∆L −∆ f ≥ 0, φ4 ≥ 0 and φ4 ∂ L
∂ φ4
= 0.
We prove ∆ f = 0 by contradiction. Suppose that ∆ f > 0, then ∂ L/∂∆ f = 0, which is
equivalent to
−λ+φ1 +φ2 −φ3 −φ4 = 0 (69)
From the constraint (ICH3), we know that ∆H ≥ TH/(1− µH) > 0. Since ∆H∂ L/∂∆H = 0,
then ∂ L/∂∆H = 0, which is equivalent to
− (1−λ)−φ1µL −φ2 +φ3 +φ4 = 0 (70)
Combining and solving (69) and (70), we obtain that φ1 = 1/(1−µL)> 0. As φ1∂ L/∂ φ1 =
0, it must be that ∂ L/∂ φ1 = 0, which is equivalent to
∆ f −µL∆H +µL∆L = 0 (71)
By substituting (71) into ∂ L/∂ φ4, we get
∂ L
∂ φ4
=∆H −∆L −∆ f = ( 1
µL
− 1)∆ f > 0 (72)
Thus, φ4 = 0 because φ4∂ L/∂ φ4 = 0. Substituting φ4 = 0 into (69), we get
φ3 +λ= φ1 +φ2 (73)
Substituting (73) into ∂ L/∂∆L ≤ 0, then
∂ L
∂∆L
= (µL −µH)φ3 ≤ 0⇒ φ3 ≤ 0, (74)
where the implication holds because µL ≥ µH . In addition, as φ3 ≥ 0, it must hold that
φ3 = 0. Replacing φ1 = 1/(1−µL) and φ3 = 0 into (73), we obtain
φ2 = λ− 11−µL < 0, (75)
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where the inequality holds because λ ∈ [0,1] and µL ∈ (q, 1]. The inequality in (75) yields
a contradiction to φ2 ≥ 0. Therefore, the supposition that ∆ f > 0 cannot hold and thus
∆ f = 0.
By substituting ∆ f = 0, the four incentive constraints are reduced to
µL(∆H −∆L)≤ 0, (ICL2)
∆H −µL∆L − TH ≤ 0, (ICL3)
∆H −µH∆L − TH ≥ 0, (ICH1)
∆H −∆L ≥ 0. (ICH2)
We can summarize the four constraints as
TH
1−µH ≤∆H =∆L ≤
TH
1−µL . (76)
Since the consumer’s surplus is strictly decreasing in ∆L and ∆H , it is maximized by setting
∆L =∆H = TH/(1−µH). The optimal triple {∆ f ,∆L,∆H} is therefore
∆ f = 0, ∆L =∆H =
TH
1−µH . (77)
By combining the triple {∆ f ,∆L,∆H} and pH f = 0, we obtain the optimal contract
pL f = pH f = 0, pLs = pHs =
TH
ρ(1−µH) . (78)
It remains to check whether this contract satisfies the constraint (IR). Under the contract,
the expert’s expected payoff equals to
Π(TS) = [λµL + (1−λ)] TH1−µH − (1−λ)TH =
qTH
1−µH > 0. (79)
Therefore, the contract is optimal since it also satisfies the constraint (IR). Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 6: Note that SLS(q) is increasing in q, while SHS(q) is decreasing in q





(1−µH)2 TH + (1−σ)TH +σ(ρL − TH)> 0, (80)
∂ SHS(q)
∂ q
= (σ− 1)(ρL − TH + 1−σ
σ
TH)− (2σ− 1)TH
σ(1−σ)(1− q)2 < 0, (81)
by µ′H ≡ ∂ µH/∂ q > 0 and (13).
Since SLS(0) = σ(TH −ρL)< 0 and SLS(q)→ +∞ for q→ 1, by continuity there exists a
unique qˆL ∈ (0,1) such that
SLS(qˆL)≡ 0. (82)
In addition, as ∂ SLS(q)/∂ q > 0 and SLS(qL) = qL TH/(1−µH)> SLS(qˆL)≡ 0, it follows that
qL > qˆL. (83)
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Similarly, since SHS(0) = (1−σ)(ρL − TH) > 0 and SHS(q)→ −∞ for q→ 1, by continuity
there exists a unique qˆH ∈ (0, 1) such that
SHS(qˆH)≡ 0. (84)
Note also that
qH > qˆH , (85)
because ∂ SHS(q)/∂ q < 0 and SHS(qH) = (λµL + 1 − λ)(µH − µL)TH/(1 − µH)(1 − µL) <
SHS(qˆH)≡ 0 since (13).
It is easily verified, that
qˆH < qˆ < qˆL (86)
Therefore, implementing the treatment strategy S is optimal if and only if
qˆH ≤ q ≤ qˆL (87)
Outside this interval, implementing H is optimal for q < qˆH , while implementing L for q > qˆL.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 8: Let us ignore the constraint (IR)for the moment, which will be
checked later. Then the consumer’s problem can be divided into two symmetric cases, which
are to minimize the expected payment to the expert t after a signal sL and sH , respectively.
Define ∆i ≡ ρ(pis − pi f ), with i ∈ {H, L}. Then the consumer’s program can be rewritten as
min{pi f ,∆i}
pi f +∆i (88)
subject to
(1−µi)∆i ≥ Ti, (ICi)
pi f ≥ 0, pi f +∆i ≥ 0. (LL)
Note that the constraint (ICi) puts no further restriction on pi f . Thus pi f = 0 follows
immediately from the first inequality of constraint (LL). Furthermore, it is obvious that
setting ∆i = TH/(1− µi) is optimal as the payment is increasing in ∆i. By plugging pi f = 0
into ∆i, we get pis = TH/ρ(1−µi). In brief, the optimal payments after a signal si are
pi f = 0, pis =
TH
ρ(1−µi) . (89)
It remains to check that this contract indeed satisfies the constraint (IR). The expert’s


















where Πs(TH) > 0 by (13). This proves that the contract in (89) for i ∈ {L, H} is optimal.
Q.E.D.
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Proof of Proposition 9: Define ∆L ≡ ρ(pLs − pL f ) and ∆H ≡ ρ(pHs − pH f ). Ignoring the
constraint (IR) for the moment, the consumer’s problem is then reduced to
min{(pLs ,pL f ),(pHs ,pH f )}
λ(pL f +µL∆L) + (1−λ)(pH f +∆H) (91)
subject to
(1−µL)∆L ≤ TH , (ICL)
(1−µH)∆H ≥ TH , (ICH)
pL f ≥ 0, pH f ≥ 0,
pL f +∆L ≥ 0, pH f +∆H ≥ 0, (LL)
Obviously, it follows immediately from the first line of (LL) that pL f = pH f = 0 as the
other constraints impose no further restriction and the total payments are increasing in pL f
and pH f . By substituting pL f = pH f = 0 into the second line of (LL) and combining it with
(ICL) and (ICH), we get
0≤∆L ≤ TH1−µL , (92)
∆H ≥ TH1−µH . (93)
Note that the total payments are strictly increasing both in∆L and in∆H . Thus setting∆L = 0
and ∆H = TH/(1−µH) is optimal. By definition ∆L and ∆H we obtain the payments
pLs = pL f = pH f = 0, pHs =
TH
ρ(1−µH) . (94)
Under the contract, the profits of the agent t and the consumer’s expected surplus are
Πs(TS) = (1−λ) µH TH1−µH , S
s
S = (λµL + 1−λ)ρL − 1−λ1−µH TH . (95)
Note that Πs(TS)> 0 by (13), which implies that this contract indeed satisfies the constraint
(IR). Therefore, the contract in (94) is optimal. Q.E.D.








(1−σ)TH +σ(ρL − TH)> 0, (96)
by µ′H ≡ ∂ µH/∂ q > 0 and by (13).
In addition, as SsLS(0) = σ(TH−ρL)< 0 and SsLS(q)→ +∞ for q→ 1, by continuity there
exists a unique qsL ∈ (0, 1) such that
SsLS(q
s













L > qˆL, (99)
as ∂ SsLS(q)/∂ q > 0.
On the other hand, SsHS(q) is decreasing in q because
∂ SsHS(q)
∂ q





TH < 0. (100)
Furthermore, since SsHS(0) = (1−σ)(ρL − TH)> 0 and SsHS(1)→−∞ with for q→ 1, there
exists an unique qsH ∈ (0,1) such that
SHS(q
s
H) = 0. (101)
Note that

























H < qH , (105)
as ∂ SsHS(q)/∂ q < 0. Otherwise, if 1/2< σ < (
p
5− 1)/2 = γ− 1, we have
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